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Ally or Acquire? Case Studies of Compaq and Cisco as 
Additional Tests of the External Technology Life Cycle Model 
 
Edward B. Roberts1 and Wenyun Kathy Liu2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In our first paper3 we proposed a dynamic theory relating alliances and 
acquisitions to the evolution of a technology and the market it serves. Industry structure 
and critical success factors change as the underlying technology evolves from phase to 
phase, competitive pressures exerted on a firm vary, and companies respond by adopting 
changing approaches to inter- firm collaboration. During the fluid phase new technology 
companies often form marketing alliances with established technology firms and pursue 
an aggressive licensing strategy to gain market recognition. The proliferation of 
technology startups provides an opportunity for established technology companies to 
obtain new technologies or enter niche markets through acquisitions or minority equity 
investments. Anticipating the emergence of a dominant design, companies can form 
standards alliances to promote their own proprietary technologies. During the transitional 
phase, companies with dominant designs gain recognition from the stock market, and 
soaring stock prices make it possible for them to acquire some of their competitors. 
During the mature phase, technology is well defined and competition becomes intense. 
Companies can form technology alliances to cut R&D costs. If a particular technology 
cannot be developed in-house, companies can acquire it on the open market. Marketing 
alliances frequently help companies target latent markets and expand into new 
geographic markets. During the phase of technological discontinuities the market is 
invaded by new technologies. Incumbents can utilize their resources to acquire the 
technologies needed for the newly defined marketplace. Attackers can gain market 
recognition through forming strategic supply alliances with established technology 
companies, which for the attackers is akin to the fluid phase behavior described above. In 
that first paper we illustrated these phenomena with a detailed case study of Microsoft, 
the world's leading software firm, from its origins until 2000. 
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 In this paper we further examine this hypothesized technology life cycle model 
through additional case studies of two high-tech companies during the same time period 
as the Microsoft analysis (i.e., until the year 2000): Compaq Computer and Cisco 
Systems. Compaq Computer was then the No.1 personal computer (PC) manufacturer in 
the world and is now a major portion of HP Corporation, and Cisco Systems was and still 
is the leading computer networking company. Each of these companies faced unique 
challenges at each stage of development of its underlying technologies and markets, 
which in turn affected its choice and extent of use of collaborative strategies. The 
additional case studies illustrate varying degrees of concurrence with the hypothesized 
dynamic model, and raise new issues for theory building. Each company’s history is 
synopsized at the end of this paper in accord with the technology life cycle theory. 
 
2. Compaq Computer 
2.1 Fluid Phase (1982-1986)  
Established in 1982 Compaq Computer got its name from a combination of two 
words: compatibility and quality. The company aimed at manufacturing high-quality 
IBM PC-compatibles. Unlike Microsoft Compaq entered the personal computer market 
without a revolutionary technology. 4 But from the very beginning the company was first 
to market with new technologies developed by the leading players of the industry. Thus, 
in a sense, its “technology” was being “first in with high quality” for PCs. In 1982 
Compaq was first to market with a portable computer, the Compaq Portable PC. In its 
first full year of existence Compaq shipped more than 53,000 portable PCs, and its 
revenue reached a record of $329 million. 5 It became the world’s second largest supplier 
of 16-bit personal computers in 1984. 
Other than IBM Compaq's strongest competitor in the early stage was AT&T. 
(Oh, how soon we forget!!) Both companies had very strong financial strength and 
technological expertise. Most of the other computer companies such as Corona Data 
Systems and Eagle Computer were small and did not constitute any strong competitive 
threat to Compaq. During this phase compatibility with IBM’s equipment was the key to 
Compaq's growth. Compaq won significant market share with its first-to-market strategy, 
bringing new product models with a short time cycle. It introduced the Compaq Portable 
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PC in 1982, Compaq Deskpro in 1884, Deskpro 286 and Portable 286 in 1985, and 
Compaq Portable II in 1987. 
During these early years Compaq engaged in very little alliance and acquisition 
activity. It primarily sold its products through a channel system and did not form 
marketing alliances. As it adopted the PC technologies developed by others, it pursued a 
strategy of licensing. It licensed in key PC technologies including the MS-DOS operating 
system from Microsoft and PC hardware technologies from IBM. For the technologies it 
wasn’t able to license in, Compaq developed them in-house. It carried out no acquisition 
activity during this fluid stage. 
2.2 Transitional Phase (1987-1990) 
By 1987 the “Wintel” system (Microsoft’s Windows and Intel’s chips) had been 
established as the dominant PC technologies. Worldwide PC sales embarked on a road of 
rapid growth and Compaq was well positioned to take advantage of the PC boom. In 
1989 its sales reached US$2.9 billion, averaging an annual growth rate of 50% for the 
transitional phase.6  Compaq took over IBM’s position as the No.1 PC manufacturer in 
the world.  
During this phase competition began to mount from other computer companies 
such as Dell and Olivetti. Compaq did not pay much attention to the competitive threat as 
its products were perceived to have higher quality, hence more reliable. In the meantime 
Compaq continued to improve its products and bring the most advanced technologies to 
the market. It introduced Portable 386 in 1987, Deskpro 386/20 in 1988, SLT/286 Laptop 
in 1989, and LTE Notebook PC and Systempro Server PC in 1990. 
 Compaq began to be slightly more active in alliances than it had been in the fluid 
stage. It participated in a number of joint R&D agreements, joint marketing agreements, 
and licensing agreements. Its partners included Novell, Nexgen and Microsoft. However, 
its alliance strategy was hardly well thought out. In 1988 it joined the Extended Industry 
Standard Architecture (EISA) Alliance, created by nine IBM competitors including AST 
Research, Compaq Computer, Epson, Hewlett-Packard, NEC, Olivetti, Tandy, WYSE, 
and Zenith Data Systems. It was one of the earliest standards promotion alliances in the 
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computer industry. But EISA failed to become the industry standard as Intel’s PCI 
ultimately won the battle. Compaq did not carry out any acquisitions during this phase.  
2.3 Mature Phase (1991-1995)  
 The competition against Compaq intensified in 1990 as the clone makers began to 
offer the same technical quality and innovation for which Compaq had been known and 
they offered a much lower price to the customers. During this mature stage (Utterback7 
refers to it as the "specific stage") customers were most concerned with price and 
availability as quality and functionality of the PC brands converged. Compaq Deskpros 
faced stiff challenges from ALR, AST, and a growing number of Asian companies that 
had access to the same components that Compaq used. Annual growth rate dropped 
below zero in 1991 for the first time in Compaq history. The competition forced Compaq 
to change its product strategies.  
The new CEO, Eckhard Pfeiffer, went beyond the immediate task of cost cutting 
– he wanted to make Compaq a top player in the industry by leveraging its worldwide 
presence and high- level brand recognition. Along with new distribution strategies, better 
customer support, aggressive prices, and a Japanese expansion, the company rebounded. 
In September 1992 Compaq slashed prices for its personal computers by as much as 50%, 
and sales jumped 75% from 1992 to 1993. By August 1995 Compaq leapfrogged into the 
No.1 position in overall PC sales in the United States. In the meantime Compaq devoted 
much of its attention to pursuing the global market. The strategy paid off – it became the 
largest supplier of personal computers in the world in 1994. 
However, the competitive pressures from Dell, AST and other low-cost 
manufacturers remained strong throughout the ‘90s. Despite its internal efforts at cost 
control Compaq was forced to participate in a broader range of collaborative activities. 
From 1990 to 1995 Compaq took part in 61 alliances and joint ventures. Of these 
partnerships 57%  included joint marketing arrangements and 48%  involved joint 
research and development agreements.  Licensing agreements and manufacturing 
operations each accounted for 10%. Given the strong customer nature of Compaq’s 
business it is not surprising that the majority of the strategic partnerships involved joint 
sales and marketing agreements. The main objective of these marketing alliances was to 
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provide integrated solutions to meet customers’ needs. To keep up with the rapid 
technological changes in the computer industry Compaq also participated in a wide 
variety of joint research and development ventures. 
 
 R&D Marketing Licensing Manufacturing Total 
1990 2 3 1 0 4 
1991 2 4 2 0 9 
1992 7 6 1 0 12 
1993 3 8 0 1 10 
1994 7 7 2 2 12 
1995 10 9 2 4 18 
1996 7 6 1 0 12 
1997 6 9 5 4 15 
1998 9 11 2 2 24 
1999 3 11 2 1 17 
Table 1.  Compaq’s Alliances and Joint Ventures  (1990-1999)8 
 
To establish its leadership in the entire computer industry Compaq also began to 
make minority equity investments and acquisitions. In 1995 Compaq acquired Thomas-
Conrad and NetWorth. Both acquisitions were part of Compaq’s inter-networking 
business strategy that aimed to enhance its ability to provide more tightly integrated 
enterprise-class computing systems to commercial customers. In addition to acquisitions 
Compaq made three equity investments. The investment in Nexgen Microsystems was 
undertaken to hedge against Intel’s microprocessors, but failed since Intel won the battle 
for the industry standard. The investment in Silicon Graphics (SGI) turned out to be 
profitable as SGI became a leading manufacturer in high-end workstations. In the 
meantime Compaq was able to access SGI’s advanced graphics products. 
 
Minority Equity Investments 
Company                         Date                Business Description 
Nexgen Microsystems  3/06/90 Manufacture microprocessors, $25 million 
Silicon Graphics 4/03/91 High-end computer systems, joint R&D, joint 
marketing 
PureSpeech 6/21/95 Develop speech recognition products, joint 
R&D 
 
Acquisitions  
Company                         Date                Business Description 
Thomas-Conrad 10/18/95 Maker of network interface cards and hubs 
NetWorth 11/6/95 Leading developer of Fast Ethernet hubs, 
switches and related products 
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switches and related products 
Table 2. Compaq’s Minority Equity Investments and Acquisitions (1990-1995) 
  
2.4 Discontinuities Phase (1996-2000)  
 Compaq Computer’s growth rate slowed down during the second half of the 
1990s. The global PC market was deep into its maturity phase and competition was 
stronger than ever. Several key competitors established themselves as the industry 
innovators by introducing new business models rather than new technologies. Dell 
Computer, for example, was extremely successful with its direct sales strategy. Gateway 
became the only major PC manufacturer that had a company-owned retail network, 
which allowed for better client-oriented services. Newcomers like e-Machines stormed 
the market with computers 50% cheaper than the name brands. Compaq’s No.1 position 
was in serious jeopardy.  
 In an effort to strengthen its leadership position Compaq became increasingly 
active in alliances. From 1996 to 1999 Compaq participated in 68 joint ventures and 
alliances. This number was an annual increase of 55% over the mature phase. However, 
the distribution of these alliances was similar to the previous period as Compaq continued 
to focus on customer relationships and technology leadership. Of these partnerships 54% 
included joint marketing arrangements and 37% involved joint research and development 
agreements.  Licensing agreements and joint manufacturing operations remained 
unchanged at 10%. The joint R&D projects covered almost every aspect of PC 
technology, ranging from networking to handheld devices. 
Given the deteriorating conditions in the global PC market Compaq began to 
expand its business into new product areas. To achieve this end it went on a shopping 
spree. From 1997 to 1999 Compaq bought Tandem Computers, Microcom, Digital 
Equipment Corporation (DEC), Shopping.com and Zip2. The first three acquisitions were 
targeted at improving Compaq’s bottom line and growth prospects. Both Tandem and 
DEC were leaders in the high-end enterprise computing market, which offered a higher 
profit margin. Microcom was a leader in the remote access market. Concurrent with the 
growth of the Internet, telecommuting and portable computing, the demand for remote 
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access servers was expected to grow dramatically from $3.0 billion in 1996 to $8.3 
billion in 2000.9  
With the growing influence of the Internet in the PC market Compaq Computer 
became increasingly active in the Internet arena. In 1999 it formed a strategic partnership 
with CMGI, a leading player in the Internet economy. As part of this agreement CMGI 
agreed to collaborate with Compaq's research labs and business groups to develop and 
deploy next-generation Internet technologies. In addition Compaq sold a majority stake 
(83%) of AltaVista to CMGI.10 
 
Acquisitions  
Date                    Company                    Business Description 
April 10, 1997 Microcom Remote access servers 
June 23, 1997 Tandem 
Computers 
High end standards-based enterprise 
computing, $3.0 billion 
Jan. 26, 1998 Digital Equipment 
Corp. 
High-end workstations, servers, Internet 
search engine, $8.4 billion 
March 10, 1999  Shopping.com e-Commerce, on-line shopping, $220 million 
April 5,1999  Zip2 Industry standard local Internet platform 
 
Divestiture  
Date                    Company                    Business Description 
June 28, 1999 AltaVista Internet search engine, majority sold to CMGI 
 Table 3. Compaq’s Acquisitions (1996-2000) 
 
Table 4.  Compaq and the Four Technology Phases 
 
  
Fluid Phase 
Transitional 
Phase 
 
Mature Phase 
Discontinuities 
Phase 
Dynamics of the 
Phase 
* 83% growth rate 
* Entered the 
market with the 
dominant design 
developed by IBM, 
Microsoft and Intel 
* 50% growth rate 
* Competition 
began to mount as 
companies entered 
the high growth 
market 
* Brought to 
market PCs with 
the most advanced 
technologies 
* 50% growth rate 
* Intense 
competition in the 
PC market 
* New producers 
were able to offer 
similar quality 
with lower prices 
* 25% growth rate 
* Emergence of 
the Internet 
* Competition 
more severe from 
Dell, Gateway, 
others 
* Outdated channel 
systems 
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Priorities * Establish itself as 
the quality 
producer 
* Gain quick 
market recognition 
*Develop 
technologies that 
can't be licensed in 
* Pursue an 
aggressive growth 
strategy 
* Try to influence 
various PC 
standards 
* Cut prices 
* Control costs 
* Keep up with the 
new technologies 
* Develop a better 
distribution system 
Alliances and 
Joint Ventures 
* Pursued a 
strategy of 
licensing in 
* More active than 
in the fluid stage 
* Formed supply 
agreements, joint 
marketing, joint 
R&D agreements 
* Participated in 
EISA standards 
alliance 
* Very active 
* Participated in 
61 alliances and 
joint ventures 
*37% joint R&D, 
54% joint 
marketing, 15% 
supply agreements 
* Very active 
* Participated in 
68 joint ventures 
and alliances 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions  
* None during this 
phase 
* None during this 
phase 
* Made 3 minority 
investments 
* Bought 2 
hardware 
companies with 
networking 
hardware 
technologies 
* Made 5 
acquisitions to 
expand into new 
product and 
service markets 
* 1 partial 
divestiture 
 
 
3. Cisco Systems 
3.1  Fluid and Transitional Phases (1984-1990)11 
 Cisco Systems is the leading networking hardware company in the world. Its 
family of products allows data to be accessed by computers on the network, even across 
different operating systems. Founded in 1984 Cisco’s first product was a router that 
translated e-mails from computers with different operating systems. In its early years 
Cisco enjoyed rapid sales growth as its technologies served a niche market. Strictly a 
router company, it sold 5,000 routers for a total revenue of $70 millions in 1990. 
During this phase competition was very low for Cisco. One priority was to gain 
market recognition. Cisco made a number of marketing alliances and supply agreements. 
However, it was not very active in alliances activities at this stage nor did it make any 
acquisitions during these early years. Cisco was able to grow rapidly without the help of 
alliances and acquisitions. The main reason for its early success is that its router 
technology was a pioneering product and there was little competition.  
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3.2 Mature Phase (1991-1996)  
 As the PC market started to take shape, the networking market began its rapid 
expansion in 1991. Like Microsoft Cisco had the right technologies at the right time and 
it took full advantage of the market expansion. From 1991 to 1996 Cisco sales grew by 
an average rate of 100% on a yearly basis. In 1996 the company sold 824,000 routers and 
net sales reached a record of $4.1 billion, a 5,750% increase from 1990.  
During this phase competition began to rise and Cisco's main competitor was 
Wellfleet Communications. New alternative networking technologies such as Ethernet 
and ATM switching products were developed by niche startups. Their presence 
threatened to take away some of the router market from Cisco. Cisco actively participated 
in alliances and acquis itions to ensure its technological and market leadership. From 1991 
to 1996 Cisco participated in 27 joint ventures and alliances. Of these partnerships 47% 
included joint marketing arrangements, 27% had licensing agreements and 40% included 
joint research and development agreements. As expected from the theory most of Cisco’s 
alliances during this phase aimed at marketing its products and developing new 
technologies. The majority of its marketing partners were established computer 
manufacturers including Apple, Compaq, DEC, IBM, NEC and Siemens. 
In addition to alliances Cisco made minority equity investments in 12 technology 
startups. Most of these investments were part of comprehensive strategic alliance 
agreements. Forty-percent of the alliances included investments by Cisco, signaling that 
many of Cisco’s partners were technology startups. Equity investments and alliances can 
and did lead to future acquisitions. For example, in February 1995 Cisco formed a broad 
strategic alliance with NETSYS Technologies, and made a minority investment in the 
company. Twenty months later it acquired the whole company for its network 
infrastructure management and performance analysis software. 
 
Minority Equity Investments 
Date Company Business Description 
12/93 Cascade 
Communications 
Telecommunications technology 
1/95 International 
Network Services 
Leading provider of network integration, management and 
consulting services 
2/95 NETSYS 
Technologies 
Developer of problem solving, modeling and simulation 
software for network managers 
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Technologies software for network managers 
10/95 CyberCash Leading developer of software and service solutions for 
secure financial transactions over the Internet 
12/95 Objective Systems 
Integrators 
Leading developer of network management software for 
service providers 
1/96 Terayon Cable-based digital communications 
4/96 DataBeam Provide communication and application protocols and 
services 
4/96 Precept Software Leading developer of networking software 
5/96 Visigenic Software Provider of standards-based database connectivity and 
distributed object messaging 
12/96 VeriSign Leading provider of digital authentication products and 
services 
12/96 Interlink Computer 
Sciences 
Leading supplier of high-performance solutions for enterprise 
networked systems management 
12/96 OpenConnect 
Systems 
Leading provider of internetworking software, systems and 
development tools 
Table 5. Cisco's Minority Equity Investments (1991-1996)12 
 
During this phase Cisco made 14 technology acquisitions. Given the rapid growth 
of the networking industry Cisco’s internal technological capacity was no longer 
sufficient to meet demands. In 1993 it made a conscious effort to acquire key 
technologies that were either too expensive or too time consuming to develop in-house. 
Through these acquisitions Cisco was able to branch out into new product areas including 
Gigabit Ethernet, LAN and ATM switchers, ISDN, and network management software. 
All of the companies it acquired were technology leaders in their respective niche fields. 
Twelve out of fourteen companies were privately held. Most of the early acquisitions 
turned out to be very profitable. Its first acquisition, Crescendo, which Cisco bought in 
1993 for $100 million, is the foundation of a unit that grew to generate over $4 billion in 
annual revenues.13 Many of Cisco's current core products - routers, LAN and ATM 
switches, dialup access servers and network management software – were acquired 
during this stage. 
 
Acquisitions  
Date  
 
Company 
 
Business Description 
9/21/93 Crescendo 
Communications 
High-performance networking products 
7/12/94 Newport Systems 
Solutions 
Providing software-based routers for remote network sites 
10/24/94 Kalpana Manufacturer of LAN switching products 
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12/8/94 LightStream Enterprise ATM switching 
8/10/95 Combinet Leading maker of ISDN remote-access networking 
products 
9/6/95 Internet Junction Developer of Internet gateway software connecting 
desktop users with the Internet 
9/27/95 Grand Junction 
Networks 
Leading supplier of Fast Ethernet (100Base-T) and 
Ethernet desktop switching products 
10/27/95 Network 
Translation 
Manufacturer of cost-effective, low maintenance network 
address translation and Internet firewall hardware and 
software 
1/23/96 TGV Software Leading supplier of Internet software products for 
connecting disparate computer systems over local area, 
enterprise-wide and global computing networks 
4/22/96 Stratacom Leading supplier of Asynchronous Transfer Mode and 
Frame Relay high-speed wide area network switching 
equipment 
8/6/96 Noshoba Networks Switching products targeted at the workgroup and 
backbone environments 
7/22/96 MICA 
Technologies 
High-density digital modem technology 
9/3/96 Granite Systems Standards-based multi-layer Gigabit Ethernet switching 
technologies 
10/4/96 Netsys 
Technologies 
Pioneer in network infrastructure management and 
performance analysis software 
Table 6. Cisco's Acquisitions (1991-1996)14 
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Figure 1. Cisco Sales and Growth Rate (1990-1999)15 
 
3.3   The Discontinuities Phase (1997-2000)   
As corporate intranets continued their rapid expansion, Cisco became the No.1 
networking company that provided end-to-end hardware, software and network 
management solutions. The emergence of the Internet brought new growth potential as 
well as new competition. Competitive pressure became strong as more and more 
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companies were attracted to the network market as a result of the high profit margins and 
strong growth prospects. Cisco’s top competitors included 3Com, Alcatel, Cabletron, 
Ericsson, IBM, Juniper, Lucent, Nortel and Siemens. 
To maintain its technological and market leadership Cisco intensified its 
technology acquisition efforts. Between 1997 and 2000 Cisco purchased 42 companies in 
three plus years. In the first four months of the year 2000 alone Cisco bought nine 
companies for a record price tag of $3 billion in total. This amount was equivalent to 
Cisco’s fourth quarter revenue in 1999. The target companies varied in size, ranging from 
$19 million to $800 million per transaction. While Cisco’s early acquisitions focused on 
key networking technologies such as routers and switches, the more recent acquisitions 
targeted a wider range of products and services. Since 1999, it has acquired companies 
with technologies in multimedia, e-commerce, and networking materials. 
 
Acquisitions  
Date 
 
Company 
 
Business Description 
3/26/97 Telesend Specializing in wide area network access products 
6/9/97 SkyStone Systems Innovator of high-speed Synchronous Optical 
Networking/Synchronous Digital Hierarchy technology 
6/24/97 Global Internet 
Software 
Pioneer in the Windows NT network security 
marketplace 
6/24/97 Ardent 
Communications 
Pioneer in designing combined communications support 
for compressed voice, LAN, data and video traffic 
across public and private Frame Relay and ATM 
networks 
7/28/97 Dagaz Broadband networking company 
12/22/97 LightSpeed Voice signaling technologies 
2/18/98 WheelGroup Leader in intrusion detection and security scanning 
software products 
3/11/98 NetSpeed Customer premise equipment, central office products 
and broadband remote access 
3/11/98 Percept Software Leading multimedia networking software company 
5/4/98 CLASS Data Systems Allocate network resources according to company 
policies and priorities 
7/28/98 Summa Four Leading provider of programmable switches 
8/21/98 American Internet Leading provider of software solutions for IP address 
management and Internet access 
9/15/98 Clarity Wireless Leading developer of wireless communication 
technology 
10/14/98 Selsius Systems Leading supplier of network PBX systems for high-
quality telephony over IP networks 
12/2/98 Pipelinks, Inc. Pioneer in SONET/SDH routers capable of 
simultaneously transporting circuit-based traffic and 
routing IP traffic  
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4/8/99 Fibex Systems Pioneer in Integrated Access Digital Loop Carrier 
products 
4/8/99 Sentient Networks Developed the industry's highest density ATM Circuit 
Emulation Services Gateway 
4/13/99 GeoTel 
Communications 
Software solution integrates enterprise data applications 
with voice infrastructure devices 
4/28/99 Amteva Technologies IP-based middleware that consolidates voicemail, e-
mail and fax on a single IP network 
6/17/99 TransMedia 
Communications 
Provide Media Gateway technology that unites the 
multiple networks 
6/29/99 StratumOne 
Communications 
Provide highly integrated semiconductor products for 
very high speed wide area 
8/16/99 Calista Allow legacy digital phones to interoperate with New 
World voice-enabled switches and routers 
8/18/99 MaxComm 
Technologies 
Enable the delivery of additional voice lines and high 
speed data over broadband to the home 
8/26/99 Monterey Networks Best-in-class optical transport product that focuses on 
the core of next-generation optical transport networks 
8/26/99 Cerent Optical transport market with next-generation products 
9/15/99 Cocom A/S European developer of standards-based access solutions 
over cable TV networks 
9/22/99 WebLine 
Communications 
Leading provider of customer interaction management 
software for Internet customer service and e-commerce 
10/26/99 Tasmania Network 
Systems 
Leading deve loper of network caching software 
technology 
11/9/99 Aironet Wireless 
Communications 
Leading developer of standards-based, high speed 
wireless LAN products 
11/11/99 V-Bits Leading provider of standards-based digital video 
processing systems for cable television service 
providers 
12/16/99 Worldwide Data 
Systems 
Leader in consulting and engineering services for 
converged data and voice networks 
12/17/99 Internet Engineering 
Group 
Leading developer of high-performance software 
12/20/99 Pirelli Optical 
Systems 
Leading developer of Dense Wave Division 
Multiplexing equipment 
1/19/00 Compatible Systems Leading developer of standards-based, reliable and 
scalable VPN solutions for service provider networks 
1/19/00 Altiga Networks Market leader in integrated VPN solutions for remote 
access applications 
2/16/00 Growth Networks Market leader in Internet switching fabrics, a new 
category of networking silicon 
3/1/00 Atlantech 
Technologies 
Leading provider of network element management 
software 
3/16/00 JetCell Leading developer of standards-based, in-building 
wireless telephony solutions for corporate networks 
3/16/00 InfoGear Technology Leading provider of Internet appliances and software 
used to manage information appliances for Internet 
access 
3/29/00 SightPath Leading provider of appliances for creating intelligent 
Content Delivery Networks 
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Content Delivery Networks 
4/11/00 PentaCom Leading provider of products implementing Spatial 
Reuse Protocol 
4/12/00 Seagull 
Semiconductor 
Leading developer of silicon technology 
 Table 7. Cisco's Acquisitions (1997-2000)16 
 
 Besides acquisitions Cisco has formed formal strategic alliances with prominent 
technology companies including EDS, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Motorola and Microsoft. 
Between 1997 and 2000 it participated in 71 joint ventures and alliances. The number of 
joint venture agreements it signed increased steadily over those four years. Of these 
partnerships 55% of them included joint marketing arrangements, 15% involved minority 
equity investments and 35% of them had joint research and development agreements. As 
the competition intensified, marketing alliances became more important as Cisco 
attempted to provide complete end-to-end hardware and software solutions to its 
customers. During this stage many of the strategic relationships were long-term and 
consisted of multiple initiatives. 
 
 R&D Marketing Licensing Equity Investments17 Standards  Total 
1997 4 4 0 6 1 14 
1998 5 11 1 2 1 18 
1999 9 15 1 2 1 22 
200018 7 9 0 1 1 17 
Table 8. Cisco's Alliances and Joint Ventures (1997-2000)19 
 
Included in its 71 alliances and joint ventures Cisco made 10 minority equity 
investments, involving approximately 15%  of the cases. With the exception of KPMG, 
all the beneficiaries were technology startups. The size of investments varied, ranging 
from $4 million to $49 million. The percentage of alliances that included investments was 
one third of what it had done in the mature phase, suggesting that Cisco partnered more 
with established companies during this "discontinuities" phase.  
 
Equity 
Investments 
Date 
 
 
Company 
 
 
Business Description 
1/97 Vxtreme Leading provider of high-quality streaming video for the 
Internet and corporate networks, $4 million 
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3/97 Software.com Provide high-performance, scalable server-based 
messaging solutions 
3/97 RadioLAN Develop low-cost wireless LANs 
5/97 TIBCO Software Leading provider of publish/subscribe software and push 
technologies 
6/97 Global 
Internet.Com 
Pioneer in the Windows NT network security 
8/97 KPMG Value-added consulting, assurance, tax, and process 
management services 
2/98 Persistence 
Software 
Develop and market the real-time event notification 
system 
7/98 Belle Systems  Develop billing software 
5/99 Portal Software Leading provider of customer management and billing 
software for Internet, $39 million 
8/99 Akamai Global Internet content delivery service, $49 million 
Table 9. Cisco's Minority Investments (1997-1999) 20 
 
Table 10.  Cisco and the Four Technology Phases 
 
 Fluid  and 
Transitional Phase 
 
Mature Phase 
 
Discontinuities Phase 
Dynamics of 
the Phase 
* 160% growth rate 
* Manufactured 
routers that connected 
computers on a 
network 
* Competition very 
low 
* High growth rate as 
products cover a niche 
market 
* 100% growth rate 
* Continued rapid 
growth as PC market 
took off 
* Competition began 
to increase 
* 44% growth rate 
* Competition became 
intense 
Priorities * Establish itself as 
the quality producer 
* Gain quick market 
recognition 
*Develop 
technologies that can't 
be licensed in 
* Keep up with the 
new technologies 
* Pursue a growth 
strategy 
* Provide end-to-end 
solutions to companies 
* Keep up with the 
technological innovations 
Alliances and 
Joint Ventures 
* Pursued a strategy 
of licensing in 
* Active; participated 
in 27 alliances 
* 47% included joint 
marketing, 27% 
licensing agreements, 
40% joint R&D, 27% 
supply agreements 
* Very active; participated 
in 71 alliances 
* 35% involved joint 
R&D, 55% joint marketing 
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Mergers and 
Acquisitions  
* None during this 
phase 
* 12 equity 
investments, most of 
them made alongside 
of alliance 
agreements 
* 14 technology 
acquisitions in 
networking 
technologies 
* Very active 
* Bought 42 companies in 
networking, multimedia, e-
commerce and networking 
materials 
* 10 minority investments, 
all of which were made as 
part of broader alliance 
agreements 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we studied the collaborative activities of two high-tech companies 
with respect to the technology life cycle. Each company operates in a distinct market 
sector in the computer industry: Microsoft, examined in our previous paper, is software, 
Compaq is hardware, and Cisco is networking. Despite the differences in their 
businesses, the three case studies are generally but not wholly supportive of the 
technology life cycle model, and demonstrate that decisions to ally or acquire by high-
tech companies relate to the evolution of the technology and the market structure. 
In the fluid phase companies tend to focus on improving product functionality and 
gaining quick market recognition. The model proposes that companies are expected to 
form marketing alliances with key players of the supply chain or with one industry 
leader. Companies can also form standards alliances and adopt a variety of licensing 
strategies. In its fluid phase Microsoft established an important strategic relationship with 
IBM. With its dominance in the mainframe market IBM was able to quickly establish its 
PC as the dominant design. With its operating system quickly recognized as the industry 
standard Microsoft adopted an aggressive licensing strategy during this stage, and its first 
customers included big corporations such as General Electric and Citibank. Compaq 
Computer entered the fluid phase with the dominant technologies from IBM and 
Microsoft. It made several agreements to license in the necessary technologies. As most 
of its products were sold through channel distribution, it did not participate in marketing 
alliances during this phase. In its fluid phase Cisco encountered very little competition 
and rapid growth. Its router technologies covered a niche marketplace. Cisco was not 
very active in either alliances and acquisitions during this stage. It made several 
marketing and supply agreements and no acquisitions. During the fluid phase only 
Microsoft really did what the model had expected it to do. Neither Compaq nor Cisco 
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aggressively marketed its technology to others. Compaq entered the market with other 
firms’ technologies already recognized by the market, and Cisco’s technology was 
pioneering enough for the market to come to the technology. 
In the transitional phase the model asserts that high-tech firms are expected to 
form joint R&D ventures, adopt aggressive licensing strategies to realign their technology 
portfolio, and sign marketing and supply agreements to guarantee consistent quality, 
price and availability. Microsoft indeed carried on its aggressive licensing strategy, and 
the strategic alliance with IBM continued to be instrumental to Microsoft’s growth. As 
Microsoft’s dominance was recognized by the financial market, it made its first 
acquisition with its soaring stock, adding an application software program that fit nicely 
with Microsoft’s family of office products. During its transitional phase Compaq 
Computer pursued a growth strategy as expected by the model. It formed several supply 
agreements, joint marketing alliances and joint R&D ventures. Like Compaq, Cisco was 
only slightly more active in alliances at this stage than during the fluid phase. All three 
companies behaved somewhat differently from the predictions of the life cycle model. 
Microsoft did indeed pursue an aggressive licensing strategy, but it did very little in terms 
of joint R&D and marketing. Both Compaq and Cisco remained quite inactive during this 
phase, which is puzzling. Even with the dominant technology, firms were expected to 
participate in joint R&D and marketing alliances. 
In the mature phase of the technology life cycle, firms are expected to be very 
active in alliances, joint ventures and acquisitions. They are presumed to form joint R&D 
ventures to share risks and costs of technology development. They can use manufacturing 
alliances to assure availability of essential products and form marketing alliances to 
attack latent markets. Indeed Microsoft engaged in 36 joint ventures and alliances during 
this stage. Of these partnerships 61% involved joint research and development ventures 
and 39% included joint marketing agreements. The technology ventures allowed 
Microsoft to access the most advanced technologies in the field. Microsoft’s partners 
included most of the leading hardware companies at the time. During its mature phase 
Microsoft made several minority equity investments and two acquisitions in the 
application software area. The competition against Compaq intensified in 1990 as clone 
makers began to offer the same technical quality at a lower price. In addition to its 
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internal efforts at cost control, Compaq began during its mature phase to participate in a 
broad range of collaborative activities. From 1990 to 1995 it took part in 65 joint 
ventures, the majority of which were supply agreements and marketing alliances. To keep 
up with the rapid technological changes in the computer industry, it engaged in 31 joint 
research and development ventures. Originally a router company, Cisco branched out into 
virtually every market segment in the networking area through acquisitions during this 
stage. Cisco made 14 technology acquisitions as its internal technological capacity was 
no longer sufficient to meet demands. The majority of its target companies were privately 
held. During its mature phase Cisco participated in 27 joint ventures and made 12 
minority equity investments. Forty percent of its alliances included investments, 
suggesting that many of Cisco’s partners were technology startups. Of Cisco’s 27 
strategic partnerships 47 % included joint market arrangements and 40% involved joint 
R&D ventures. As the model predicts for the mature phase, all three companies actively 
engaged in alliances, namely joint R&D ventures and joint marketing agreements. Both 
Microsoft and Compaq began to make equity investments and acquisitions, but their 
actions were limited. Cisco, on the other hand, made a conscious effort to acquire 
technologies it was not able to develop in-house. The proliferation of alternative 
networking technologies was the rationale behind Cisco’s strategy.  
As the technology enters the discontinuities phase firms are expected to 
participate in marketing and licensing agreements as well as joint R&D ventures. This is 
also a stage of high product and market uncertainty with invading technologies and 
converging markets. The emergence of the Internet changed the competitive landscape in 
the computer industry, and Microsoft entered its phase of technological discontinuities in 
1996. Realizing the threat of new technologies, it became increasingly active in its 
alliance and acquisition efforts. Since 1995, Microsoft participated in 35 alliances and 
joint ventures with 46% involving joint R&D and 51% including joint marketing 
agreements. As the market became more volatile, more emphasis was given to 
maintaining customer relationship and providing comprehensive solutions to clients. 
Given its strong financial strength Microsoft made 26 minority investments and acquired 
15 companies between 1995 and 2000. Most of its acquisitions and equity investments 
were Internet-related, ranging from services to content. Similarly, Compaq’s growth rate 
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slowed down during the second half of the 1990s as the company entered its phase of 
technological discontinuities. Several key competitors had established themselves as the 
industry innovators with new business models. In an effort to strengthen its leadership 
position, Compaq became far more active in alliances and joint ventures. Since 1996, the 
company participated in 68 alliances and joint ventures, representing an annual increase 
of 55% over its mature phase endeavors. The distribution of these alliances was similar as 
Compaq continued to focus on customer relationships. Given the low profit margin of the 
PC market during the commoditization that occurred in the mature phase, Compaq began 
to expand its business into new product areas through acquisitions. It bought three 
computer hardware companies (DEC, Tandem and Microcom), each acquisition offering 
Compaq entry to a higher margin niche market, before Compaq itself was acquired in a 
major controversial undertaking by Hewlett-Packard. As corporate intranets and the 
Internet continued rapid expansion, competitive pressure began to mount in the global 
networking market. Cisco’s top competitors included Lucent, Nortel and IBM. To 
maintain its technological leadership Cisco intensified its technology acquisition efforts. 
From 1997 to 2000 it bought a record of 42 technologies companies, ranging from 
multimedia to silicon material. With these acquisitions Cisco transformed itself into a 
complete end-to-end networking company. In addition it participated in 71 alliances and 
joint ventures and made 10 minority investments. Of these partnerships 55% included 
joint marketing arrangements and 35% had joint R&D agreements.  
Contrary to the model’s expectations all three companies were more active in 
alliances and in mergers and acquisitions during this discontinuities phase than during the 
mature phase. The companies in the three case studies were all leaders in their respective 
technology sectors. They tend to have strong financial resources. In a period of 
technological discontinuities they are willing to invest to defend against attackers while 
entering into the new growth market. All three participated in a high number of joint 
R&D and marketing alliances as predicted by the model. The pattern of acquisitions and 
equity investments is very similar to the model’s prediction as well. 
In many aspects the case studies were supportive of the technology life cycle 
model. In particular, the firms’ behaviors in the mature and discontinuities phases 
corresponded well to the theory. For the most part the companies in the case studies 
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seemed to lack collaborative activities in the early stages of technology. Yet we need to 
take into consideration that these initial stages of industry-technology emergence took 
place 20 years ago. The technology life cycle model seems somewhat biased toward more 
current events. The correspondence of theory and case ought to be best when the firm is 
closest to being a single technology homogeneous entity. The early stages of Microsoft 
and Cisco are good proxies for single technology firms, and yet Cisco shows none of the 
expected collaborative acts during its fluid and transitional periods. As the firm grows 
larger and more successful, its tendency toward broadening its technological (and 
markets) base weakens the direct applicability of the technology life cycle model. Given 
these reservations, the case studies do add important insights to the phenomena of 
technological evolution. 
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